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Abstract 
In this paper we use a two stage procedure, based on bias corrected DEA, to evaluate the 
impacts of regulatory reforms on technical efficiency of 28 Italian airports during the period 
2000–2006. We employ two different DEA models: physical and monetary. The first relies on 
the aeronautical activities, the second concerns both aeronautical and non aeronautical 
business and allows us to evaluate the impact of commercial activities on overall airport 
efficiency. The main results are: i) mixed government-private ownerships with a private 
majority are more efficient than those with a government majority; ii) the liberalization of 
ground handling services has produced an increase of efficiency in airside and landside 
activities; iii) granting all services to airport management companies can be a source of 
inefficiency due to the lack of competition in the industry; iv) the introduction of dual-till 
increases overall technical efficiency. 
 
Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), bootstrap, two stage estimation, airport 
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction  
In the ranking of the “World’s Top Tourism” destination by both international tourist 
arrivals and international tourism receipts, Italy holds respectively the fifth and the fourth 
position in 2007 (UNWTO, 2008). Between 2000 and 2006, the number of air passengers and 
cargo has been characterized by an average increase of, 5.0% and 3.3% per annum, 
respectively. In the same period low cost carriers have triggered the demand served by 
regional airports by a growth rate greater than 15.05% per annum. In Italy, as in  most 
countries, the airport evolves to become a more sophisticated market entity that may be 
considered as a “multipoint” service-provider firm(Jarach, 2001). 
Airside business is enlarged by increasing commercial activities, which involves not only 
air passengers and air transportation employees, but also local-community residents and 
industries. An efficient airport provides important economic catalysts that enable the local 
and regional economy to thrive and improve the quality of life in the region (Oum et al., 
2008). Governments around the world have taken policy measures in order to improve the 
efficiency and the productivity of airport operations. In Italy government intervention started 
during the 90’s and  is still not completed. The reforms, which have completely reshaped the 
industry boundaries, concern the concession agreement, the privatization, the liberalization of 
the ground handling services, the development of a second hub and the introduction of a dual-
till regulation scheme. Many scientific papers have been published on airport performances 
employing parametric and nonparametric methods (Gillen and Lall, 1997; Hooper and 
Hensher, 1997; Sarkis, 2000; Adler and Berechman, 2001; Martín and Román, 2001; Pels et 
al., 2001, 2003; Fernandes and Pacheco, 2003; Oum et al., 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008; Sarkis 
and Talluri, 2004; Yoshida and Fujimoto, 2004; Malighetti et al., 2007; Barros and Dieke 
2007, 2008; Curi et al., 2010; Abrate and Erbetta, 2010). In recent years, the performance of 
the Italian airport industry has been analyzed by Malighetti et al. (2007), Barros and Dieke 
(2007, 2008), Curi et al. (2010) and Abrate and Erbetta (2010) amongst others. However, to 
our knowledge, there are no studies that assess through an econometric analysis the impacts 
of regulatory reforms on the performance of the Italian airport industry. Thus we apply a two-
stage procedure based on a double bootstrap technique (Simar and Wilson, 2007) to a dataset 
composed of 28 Italian airports observed from 2000 to 2006; the main purpose of this paper is 
to measure the effects of regulatory changes on technical efficiency, whilst controlling for a 
set of independent variables. Moreover departing from previous studies, we disentangle the 
efficiency related to the airport operations from the efficiency related to the management of 
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all the business activities. Results may contribute to improve the knowledge of the decision 
makers, both at regulatory and managerial level, on the evolution of the sector in Italy.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the regulatory framework, Section 3 
focuses on the methodology, Section 4 describes the dataset as well as the input and output 
variables used in the analysis. Results are discussed in Section 5, and some concluding 
remarks are made in Section 6. 
 
2. Regulatory framework 
In recent years, airports have been under growing pressure to be more financially self-
sufficient and less reliant on government support (Carney and Mew, 2003). At a worldwide 
level, the key elements of the current discussion focus on the privatization of management 
companies, price regulation, and the increased competition among airports within the same 
country. As today, Italian airport companies manage the airports according to one of the three 
alternative types of concession agreement: “Total” (T), “Partial” (P) and “Precarious Partial” 
(PP). 
The Total agreement allows the company to manage the activities in both airside and 
landside. The management company receives revenues from all the business and is in charge 
of the maintenance of all airport infrastructures. Through the P agreement, the management 
company is only responsible for the landside and its relative pertinence. The management 
company receives both passenger terminal charges and non-aeronautical revenues from 
commercial activities, including shopping concessions, car parking, etc. Ente Nazionale 
Aviazione Civile (Enac1) is responsible on behalf of the State for maintaining and developing 
airside. Finally the PP agreement restricts revenues for the airport management company to 
only commercial activities. T agreement allows a forty year concession while both P and PP 
limit the concession period to twenty years. By the 90’s, several laws and administrative acts 
were introduced by the State with the aim of increasing competition and efficiency. The 
privatization process started in 1992 (laws n.1498/92 and n.1537/93), when airport authorities 
became stock companies. Nowadays, in most cases the airport management companies are 
characterized by a mixed government-private ownership with a local government majority. 
Moreover, with law n. 537/93 and ministerial decree n. 521/97, all airport management 
companies can apply to obtain a T concession. The business plans are evaluated by Enac, 
which after four years of trial, awarded the T concession. In 1998, the Italian government took 
                                                 
1
 Enac was established on 25th July 1997 by Legislative Decree no.250/97 as the National Authority committed 
to oversee the technical regulation, the surveillance and the control in the civil aviation field. 
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on a network configuration deploying two closely located hubs (Roma Fiumicino and Milano 
Malpensa). In 1999 the European directive on liberalization of ground handling services (EU 
96/67), forced airport management companies to open the handling market to competition 
from 2001. However, Italian law protects handling workers and forces the new handling 
companies to hire workers from the incumbents (Cló, 2004). In 2001, the Italian Committee 
for the economic planning (CIPE-Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione 
Economica) has introduced a dual-till price cap (act n.86/2000). Tariffs are price capped on 
the airside, while on the landside the monopolistic rents are “skimmed” via specific royalties. 
At the end of 2005 the law n.248/2005 introduced a modified single till. The tariff is 
determined taking into consideration the operating and maintenance costs pertaining to 
aeronautical services, depreciation and returns on aeronautical assets and 50% of gross 
revenues generated from commercial activities (CERTeT, 2006). Moreover, due to this law, 
the airport management companies are in charge of the provision of all security services. The 
cost increase generated by the provision of security services has been balanced by a 75% 
reduction in the concession fee due from the airport management company to the State. Thus 
all the above factors, affecting airport physical and monetary flows (see Fig.1), can have an 
impact on airport efficiency and they will be investigated in the following sections. 
Insert Figure 1 approximately here 
 
3. Methodology  
To analyze the effects of regulatory changes on the technical efficiency of Italian airports 
we employ a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we calculate the technical efficiency from 
2000 to 2006 for each airport. In the second stage, we run regressions to examine the effects 
of regulatory changes on the technical efficiency of airports, whilst controlling for a set of 
independent variables. In particular, in the first stage, we calculate the technical efficiency by 
DEA (Charnes et al., 1978). In the second stage, following the paper by Simar and Wilson 
(2007) we run truncated regressions to examine the effects of regulatory changes on the 
technical efficiency of airports, whilst controlling for a set of independent variables. We 
assume an output-orientated model as it ensures  accounting the objective of exploiting the 
facilities to satisfy the steady growth demand in the aviation market (Martìn and Romàn, 
2001). Moreover, we make use of standard assumptions about the production set (Simar and 
Wilson, 2000) to analyze airport efficiency in an inferential setting. In fact, the traditional 
DEA-estimator is biased in its construction and is affected by  uncertainty due to sample 
variation (Simar and Wilson, 1998, 2000, 2007). To remove these drawbacks, we apply the 
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procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (1998) to derive the sampling distributions of the 
DEA-estimator. It is based on the bootstrap technique in a Monte Carlo setting. In order to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results in the next sections, it is useful to recall that in the 
output orientated DEA model an efficiency score Dˆ  is calculated for each decision making 
unit (DMU), by solving the following linear program: 
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Where itˆθ  and itDˆ are the Farrell (1957) and Shepard’s (1970) distance functions, 
respectively; n is the number of DMUs and T is the number of time periods; Yt is a sxn matrix 
of s outputs, Xt is a rxn matrix of r inputs and λ represent a nx1 vector of weights which 
allows to obtain a convex combination between inputs and outputs. The above specification is 
under constant returns to scale (CRS); for a specification under variable returns to scale 
(VRS) the additional constraint 1’λ=0 is added, where 1’ is a vector of ones. For an output-
oriented model, itˆθ  is an inefficiency measure and assumes always values equal to or greater 
than one. Consequently, itDˆ  is an efficiency measure and it assumes values between zero and 
one. Airports with an efficiency score of unity are located on the frontier in the sense that 
their outputs cannot be further expanded without a corresponding increase in inputs. Further, 
the CRS model identifies the overall inefficiency whereas VRS model differentiates between 
(pure) technical efficiency and scale efficiency. The ratio between CRS score and VRS score 
provides a measurement of scale efficiency (Simar and Wilson, 2002). 
However, relation (1) does not allow us to determine whether the efficiency values are real, 
or merely an artifact of the fact that we do not know the true production frontiers and must 
estimate them from a finite sample (Simar and Wilson, 2000). Thus, following the mentioned 
authors we employ a consistent bootstrap estimation procedure for correcting the efficiency 
scores. The idea underlying the bootstrap is to approximate the sampling distributions of θ, by 
simulating their data generating process (DGP). In other terms, given the estimates itθˆ
 
of the 
unknown true values of itθ
 
we generate through the DGP process a series of pseudo datasets 
to obtain bootstrap estimate *ˆitθ . If the bootstrap is consistent, then: 
( ) ( ) ** ˆˆ~ˆ SS ititapproxitit θθθθ −−    t =1,2,…, T    (2) 
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Where, S  and *S  denotes the observed and the bootstrap sample. To gain consistence on 
the empirical distribution of efficiency, we use a smooth bootstrap procedure (Simar and 
Wilson, 1998). Expression (2) implies that the relation between the original estimates itθˆ
 
and 
the true values itθ  can be approximated by the relation between the bootstrapped estimates 
*
ˆ
itθ  and original estimates itθˆ . At this point, the bias of efficiency scores is estimated by their 
bootstrap approximations ititStS Eiasb θθ ˆ)ˆ(ˆ *, ** −= ; and bias-corrected estimates can be 
obtained as: 
∑
=
−
−=−=
B
b
bititititit Biasb
1
*
,
1
ˆˆ2ˆˆ~ θθθθ
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Where B is the number of the bootstrap replications. However, the bias correction 
introduces additional noise that increases the variance of the estimator. Thus, as rule of 
thumb, Efron and Tibshrani (1993) recommended not to correct for the bias unless 
)ˆ(ˆ4iasbˆ *it ittds θ> . Kneip et al. (2008) provided the consistence of this bootstrap procedure. 
Furthermore, the above algorithm allows us to run a test on the global returns to scale 
supported by the technology (Simar and Wilson, 2002). The economic literature defines two 
types of returns to scale: local returns to scale and global returns to scale. While local returns 
to scale indicate the type of resizing of the unit in which immediate gains in productivity 
should be available, global returns to scale indicate the type of resizing in which the global 
maximum productivity can be achieved. In a convex technology the two type of measure are 
identical (Podinovski, 2004). 
Now, according to Fig.1, we estimate the bias corrected efficiencies (3) for two 
complementary DEA models labeled, respectively, physic (ph) and the monetary (mo). 
Through the ph model we mainly asses the efficiency of the management company in the 
airport operations (Sarkis, 2000) while with the mo one we consider the airport as a multipoint 
service-provider firm (Jarach, 2001). In the latter case, we analyze the airport management 
company in exploiting aeronautical and non-aeronautical business. In fact, the omission of 
some outputs such as commercial services is likely to bias efficiency results as it 
underestimates productivity of the airports with proactive managers who focus on exploiting 
the revenue generation opportunities from non-aviation business (Oum et al., 2003).  
The econometric model in our two-stage analysis takes the form of a truncated regression 
model (Simar and Wilson, 2007): 
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ititit ε
ˆ +=θ βz     i=1,2,…, n; t =1,2,…, T  (4) 
Where itθˆ
 
are obtained by (1) and itz  is a set of explained variables for each unit i at time t 
and itε is ( )σ0,N  with left-truncation at βz1 it− . Separability between inputs and outputs and 
environmental variables is assumed. The regression parameters are estimated by truncated 
regression with a double bootstrap method to overcome the difficulties discussed by Simar 
and Wilson (2007). The algorithm is given in appendix A; it was developed using FEAR 
library (Wilson, 2007) for R software. 
 
4. Sample of airports and variable construction 
4.1 Input and output variables 
We consider a balanced panel data of 28 Italian airports in the period between 2000 and 
2006. Our sample includes the airports that represent different ownerships and operational 
characteristics and it covers, on average, 96%, 99% and 99% of total number of passengers, 
movements and cargos registered in Italy during 2000-2006. Data has been collected from: 
airport annual statistics (Enac, 2006), annual reports of airport management and handling 
companies and Italian National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT). Now, a management company 
can operate one or more airports and since it is not possible to obtain disaggregated economic 
data from the balance sheets as well as from Enac, we consider the management companies as 
DMUs. This means the aggregation of some physical variables concerning the airports 
managed by the same company. Moreover, in order to correctly assess technical efficiency in 
the ph model, as consequence of the liberalization of ground handling services in 2001, we 
integrate the data on the number of workers of the airport management company with those of 
the handling companies. The absence of such correction may reduce the goodness of the 
efficiency analysis in the ph model as can be deduced by looking at Fig.2. 
Insert Figure 2 approximately here 
In the ph model, we use three outputs: number of movements, number of passengers and 
amount of cargo. On input side, we consider the number of workers, runway area and airport 
area. As far as the mo model is concerned, the outputs are aeronautical and non-aeronautical 
revenues; as inputs, we use labor cost, capital invested and soft costs (Oum et al., 2004).  
 
4.2 Airports characteristics 
In order to examine the hypothesis that the efficiency is affected by environmental 
variables we consider the following elements: 
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Airport dimension: the size is an important factor in determining the operational 
performance of airports (Pels et al., 2003). Using classification of European Commission 
(EC, 2005), we identify four airport categories: 
- large Community airports (lca), with more than 10 million passengers a year; 
- national airports (naa), with an annual passenger volume of between 5 and 10 million; 
- large regional airports (lra), with an annual passenger volume of between 1 and 5 
million; 
- small regional airports (sra) with an annual passenger volume of less than 1 million. 
Demand for air transport: it is widely known that the Italian economy is affected by 
strong territorial disparities: GDP per capita in the South is around 60% of that in the 
Centre and North (Bronzini and Piselli, 2009). In order to take into account the economic 
impact of the area where the airport is located, we include the variable lw, which is 
obtained by dividing the value added per person relative to the airport area by the national 
value added per person. This variable has been introduced to measure the impact that 
economic development can lead to airport activities (Donzelli, 2010). Moreover, 
seasonality is considered to measure the difference in efficiency of airports with a strong 
influence of tourist seasonal movements (Malighetti et al., 2007). This variable is defined 
as follows: mint
max
tt yys = ; where 
min
ty  and 
max
ty  are respectively the minimum and the 
maximum number of monthly passengers in the year t. Finally, in order to take into 
account further macroeconomic shocks, a time variables t is introduced. 
Regulatory changes: as noticed in Section 2, Italian airport industry has undergone several 
reforms. Airport ownership is measured by the dummy kc, which takes on the value 1 if 
the airport has a private majority ownership and 0 otherwise. The alternative concession 
agreements are identified through two dummy variables: T and P. T assigns value 1 to 
airports holding Total concession while P is equal to 1 for airport holding Partial 
concession. Airports in which operate more than one handling company2 are identified by 
the dummy hh. Finally, the dummy dt takes into consideration the introduction of the 
dual-till regulation on airside activities in 2001. 
Table 1 provides sample statistics for the variables and Table 2 completes the description of 
the characteristics of the Italian airports.  
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
                                                 
2
 We exclude handling services directly operated by airlines (self-handling). 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1 Preliminary analysis  
In DEA models, an excessive number of inputs and outputs, respecting the number 
observations, results in a large number of efficient units (Olesen and Petersen, 1996; Kneip et 
al., 1998; Adler and Golany, 2001). In our sample, the correlation matrix reveals the presence 
of high correlation among inputs and outputs (Table 3) and in this case, a suitable aggregation 
of variables is recommended. Now, following the procedure proposed by Daraio and Simar 
(2007), the aggregate input (output) variable, or factor, is obtained as a weighted sum of the 
original variables with weight represented by the values of the first eigenvalue of the input 
(output) matrix3. Table 4 reports the factors for each model with their relative inertia4. 
Insert Table 3 approximately here 
Insert Table 4 approximately here 
The percentage of inertia explained by the aggregate variables is very high; therefore, it is 
certainly appropriate to summarize the information of the full data matrix by these factors. 
The idea of analysing airport efficiency through the physical (ph) and the monetary (mo) 
model is a posteriori supported by the analysis of estimated distributions of technical 
efficiency. Indeed, Fig.3 highlights divergence on the shape of density as well as in their 
modes and modality; in which intuitively the levels of efficiency observed most frequently for 
the two models. 
Insert Figure 3 approximately here 
 
5.2 Efficiency and Technology assessment 
The analysis of returns to scale of the technology, see Table 5, shows the existence of 
global constant returns to scale and global variable returns to scale for the ph and the mo 
model, respectively. 
Insert Table 5 approximately here 
The presence of global constant returns to scale for the ph model indicates that the Italian 
airports are not able to improve efficiency on airside activities by reducing or increasing the 
                                                 
3
 Mathematically the aggregate variable is obtained as follows: A= Xa, where X is the matrix of the input 
(output) variables and a is the first eigenvector of the matrix XX’. 
4
 The inertia is computed by dividing the first eigenvalue by the sum of all eigenvalues of the matrix XX’. It 
measures the capacity of the aggregate variable to summarize the information contained in the original variables. 
Value close to 1 indicates an accurate representation. 
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scale of their operations. However, we cannot exclude the presence of local returns to scale 
since the assumption on convexity may be violated. 
Turning our attention to the mo model, we assess the presence, at the 10% significance 
level, of constant returns to scale technologies in 2002, 2005 and 2006, and variable returns to 
scale for the remaining years. Thus, three years after the introduction of dual-till regulation in 
2001, the average airport moves toward a CRS technology. In fact, under a dual-till scheme, 
non-aeronautical services are not regulated, hence there is some scope for prices to be 
inefficiently high, but the airport will have the incentive to produce these services efficiently, 
and to invest efficiently (Forsyth, 2002). Table 6 provides the bias corrected efficiency scores 
for the ph model.  
Insert Table 6 approximately here 
The twenty-three airport management companies have progressively reduced their 
efficiency in the airside activities: 16.0% in 2006 against 24.9% in 2000. The reduction of the 
inter-quartile range reveals the existence of a technological catch-up process. The best 
performers, that is the management company with an efficiency level greater than 0.339, are 
airports with a number of passenger movements greater than one million, with the only 
exception of Treviso(TSF). Cagliari(CAG), located in Sardinia, is the airport that achieved , 
on average, the best input/output configuration. Cagliari (CAG) has been able to support the 
expansion of the terminal area, begun in 2000 and terminated in 2003, by increasing the 
traffic. In the first quartile we found airports located, with the exclusion of Trieste(TRS), in 
the center and south of the country and close to tourist locations. They are characterized by 
low traffic volume -Pescara(PSA), Trieste(TRS) and Puglia airports- and/or they face high 
seasonality in the traffic flows - Alghero(AHO) and Rimini(RMI)-. All the remaining airports 
show an average level of efficiency between 0.147 and 0.339. 
Noticeable is the decline in technical efficiency of Rome’s airport system, which can be 
explained by three factors: the opening of the second national hub of Malpensa(MPX), the 
impressive growth in the number of passengers of Ciampino(CIA) (+717%), generated by the 
low cost carrier Ryanair, and the building of a new runway in Fiumicino(FCO). 
Table 7 shows the bias efficiency scores for the mo model and the analysis of the returns to 
scale. 
Insert Table 7 approximately here 
The higher average value of the technical efficiency and the smaller inter-quartile ranges 
suggest that airport management companies are closer to the frontier under the ph model than 
under the mo one. Now, in the last quarter of the distribution of the mo model (see Table 7), 
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there are six airports: three show the persistence of decreasing returns to scale - Napoli 
(NAP), Pisa (PSA) and Venezia(VNA) - two of scale efficiency - Torino(TRN) and 
Olbia(OLB) - and one by scale efficiency and increasing returns to scale: Ancona(AOI). 
However looking at the scale index we can conclude that most of inefficiency relies on 
technical factors. About the regional airports of Torino (TRN) and Olbia (OLB), investment 
in airport infrastructures has led to significant increases, driven by low cost carriers, in the 
number of passengers. Olbia (OLB) is located in Costa Smeralda in the north-west of 
Sardegna. It is an example of a multipoint service-provider airport, which compensates for the 
poor efficiency value obtained in the core activities, due mainly to the high seasonality of its 
traffic, with an efficient management of the commercial ones. Moreover, it has been granted 
by the T concession in 2004. Napoli(NAP) and Venezia(VNA) hold a T concession and have 
majority private ownership while Pisa(PSA) is granted by a P concession. Ancona(AOI), a 
military airport open to civil traffic, is the only one that should slightly increase the output. 
We will further investigate these preliminary evidences in the second stage of the analysis. 
Finally, the first quartile is characterized by DMUs with efficiency less than 0.735: 
Alghero(AHO), Cagliari(CAG); Genova(GOA), Rimini(RMI), Trieste(TRS) and Puglia 
regional airports. The negative result obtained by Genova(GOA), which holds a T concession 
since 1954, can be ascribed to some contextual factors: lack of adequate connections to the 
city and the presence of five airports, with better connections in the range of 130 km. For the 
remaining airports, as we will analyze better below, the characteristics of the demand, low and 
with high seasonality, can be advocated to explain the low level of technical efficiencies. The 
last group includes the two large Community airport systems of Milano and Roma, as well as 
nine regional airports. The airport of Pescara(PSR) should increase its dimension in order to 
fully benefit from the increase of business generated by Ryanair. Similarly, the analysis of 
returns to scale suggests that the airports of Bergamo(BGY), Bologna(BLQ), Catania(CAT) 
and Verona(VRN) are too large in dimension. 
 
4.3. Second-stage results 
Second-stage results from the double bootstrap estimation are presented in Table 8. The 
dependent variable θˆ
 
is an inefficiency measure; therefore, the parameters with negative 
signs indicate sources of efficiency and vice versa. 
Insert Table 8 approximately here 
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In analyzing the results of the two stage analysis some attention has to be taken into 
consideration when dummy variables are examined. In fact, if a dummy is not significant, it 
still might be fairly substantial from an economic point of view, but might not be empirically 
identified due to the low power of the test on coefficients of dummy variables (Zelenyuk, 
2009). The implication is that, the corresponding policy conclusions are difficult to draw 
when the dummy variables in a two-stage analysis are not statistically significant. Taking into 
consideration the above observation we notice that mixed government-private ownership with 
a private majority contributes to the improved technical efficiency in both models. The results 
confirm the evidence by Oum et al. (2008) which suggests that countries considering the 
privatization of airports should transfer majority shares to the private sector. Thus our results, 
according to the agency theory and the strategic management literature, support the common-
sense view that government-owned firms are less productively efficient than their private 
sector counterparts. Liberalization of ground handling services has lead to significant 
technical efficiency gains in both models. As far as the role played by the concession 
agreements the two stage analysis seems to suggest that as soon as the concession grant 
moves from PP to T, the level of inefficiency increases. However, from an economic point of 
view, we can only conclude that the T concession has a negative impact on technical 
efficiency related to airside and landside business. The presence of X-inefficiencies 
(Leibenstein, 1966), due to the monopolistic nature of non airside activities, can be advocated 
to explain such empirical evidence. However, in the airside activities of the Italian airport 
industry the level of competition appears low. Even where competition can exist thanks to the 
proximity of airports, this is in fact prevented by the ownership structure of these airports’ 
management companies. This occurs in the airports of Puglia, Roma, Milano and Bergamo 
(see Table 1). The introduction of the dual-till regulation generates a positive significant 
impact on the technical efficiency of the monetary model and a negative, not significant, 
impact on the physical one. Thus even if this tariff scheme leads the airport to inefficiently 
increase prices of non-regulated non-aeronautical services, it is able to generate incentives to 
produce these services efficiently (Forsyth, 2002). However, the empirical evidence from the 
ph model, does not allow us to conclude if the possible (excess) profits earned by airports 
from non-aeronautical services has been utilized to improve airside operations.  
The positive and significant coefficient of the dummy seasonality implies a negative impact 
of seasonal demand peak on the technical efficiency of airside operations. In fact, fluctuations 
in demand for airport services and investment indivisibilities leads inevitably to excess 
capacity with important repercussions for the airport efficiency (Walters, 1978). The negative 
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and significant value of lca dummy suggests that the airport systems of Milano and Roma 
which include the two hubs of Malpensa(MPX) and Fiumicino(FCO) reach the highest 
technical efficiency improvement. This finding confirms. The widespread conclusion in 
writings on the subject that shows how hubs possess size and location advantages. For the 
remaining airports, we can only conclude that small regional airports should increase the 
number of passengers to gain operational efficiency. Thus the State should evaluate the 
possibility of closing some airports, distributing the air traffic to some other close airports (for 
example between Ancona(AOI) and Pescara(PSA) or among airports of Puglia). 
Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to draw any economic implications on the effect of 
airport dimension on the management of both airside and landside activities. Finally, a 
positive and statistical significant relationship between the efficiency score and per-capita 
GDP is found. Thus, a part of the difference between efficiencies of airports located in the 
North and those located in the South of Italy lies in the economic gap existing between the 
two geographic areas. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we use the Simar–Wilson’s two-stage procedure to analyze the efficiency of 
28 Italian airports from 2000 to 2006. Over the analyzed time period the Italian airport 
industry has experienced an important transformation concerning the change of the 
concession agreement, the privatization, the liberalization of ground handling services, the 
dual-till regulation and the development of a second national hub. In order to assess the 
impacts generated by the reform of the industry on technical efficiency, we develop two DEA 
models. The first, named physical, analyzes the technical efficiency of airport operations; 
while the second, named monetary, measures technical efficiency related to aeronautical and 
non-aeronautical activities. This research strategy has been supported, a posteriori, by the 
empirical analysis. In other terms, this paper highlights that efficient management of non-
aeronautical business appears weakly related, in terms of technical efficiency, to the one 
connected to the traditional aeronautical business. Technology assessment reveals the 
presence of constant returns to scale technologies in the airport activities and both constant 
and variable returns to scale in the management of all business activities. 
The two stage analysis shed some light on the impact generated by the regulatory reform on 
the Italian airport industry. In particular, we found that airport management companies with a 
private majority reach a higher level of technical efficiency than those with a government 
majority. A positive impact, in terms of technical efficiency gain, has been generated by the 
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liberalization of ground handling services. The analysis suggests that the reduction of 
government control generated by a T concession causes an increase of the technical 
inefficiency in the provision of landside and airside services. Hence the lack of competition, 
enforced by the capital structure of close airports, increases the negative effect generated by 
the presence of X-inefficiencies on the management conduct. The data also suggests that the 
dual-till regulation increases overall technical efficiency. Unfortunately no empirical evidence 
can be drawn on the impact of the tariff scheme on airside activities. Another remarkable 
aspect concerns the possibility of the State gaining technical efficiency by reallocating traffic 
among close small regional airports. Moreover, seasonality creates difficulties for the regional 
airports, to obtain an optimal production scale. Finally, the analysis confirms the positive 
impact that the economic development produces on airport efficiency. 
 
Appendix A: Simar and Wilson (2007) algorithm #2. 
1) Compute θˆ  from relation (1) for each airports i (i=1,2,…n) at time t (t=1,2,…T)5. 
2) DMUs with 1ˆ >θ are employed to estimate, by maximum likelihood, the parameters, 
βˆ  and the standard error εσˆ . 
3) For each airport and for each bootstrap replication b (b=1,2,…, B1) the following steps 
are executed: 
a) drawn the error component bε  from a ( )σˆ0,N  distribution with left truncation at 
b
ˆ1 βz− ; 
b) compute the estimate bbb*b εˆˆ +=θ βz ; 
c) compute the pseudo data set ( )°° bb y,x , where °bx = x  and y
θ
θ
y
*
b
b
b
ˆ
ˆ
=
° ; 
d) obtain new DEA estimate *bθ
)
 using ( )°° bb y,x  as reference set. 
4) By the bootstrap replications compute the bias corrected estimates θ~ . 
5) Use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters β~  and the variance σ~  of 
truncated regression of θ~  on z . 
6) To derive confidence intervals and significance levels for the regression parameters, a 
new loop is repeated B2 times (b’=1,2,…, B2): 
a) drawn b'ε  from a ( )σ~0,N  distribution with left truncated at 'b~1 βz− ; 
                                                 
5
 We supress the pedex to semplify the notation. 
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b) compute 
'b'b'b
**
'b ε
~~
+=θ βz ; 
c) use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters *b'
~
β
 and the variance *b'~σ  of 
truncated regression of **~θ  on z . 
7) By the bootstrap sample ( *b'
~
β ,
*
b'
~σ ) compute the confidence intervals for β~  and σ~  by 
selecting the appropriate percentiles. 
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Figures. Airport efficiency: a DEA two stage analysis of the Italian airports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Physical and monetary flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of workers in the Italian ground handling services. 
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Figure 3. Estimated density of efficiency distribution for physical and monetary model. 
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Tables. Airport efficiency: a DEA two stage analysis of the Italian airports. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Italian airports. 
Airport 
(IATA CODE) 
Ownership (o) 
1=private; 
0=public. 
Types of concession 
agreement (ca) 
(year of agreement) 
Number of handlers (hs) 
1 = # handlers >1; 0 = # 
handlers = 1 
Airport category 
Alghero (AHO) 0 PP 0 sra, lra 
Ancona (AOI) 0 PP 0 sra 
Bari, Brindisi, Foggia, 
Taranto (BRI, BDS, FOG, 
TAR) 
0 T (2002) 0 lra 
Bergamo (BGY)6 0 T (1975) 1 lra, naa 
Bologna (BLQ) 0 T (2004) 1 lra 
Cagliari (CAG) 0 P 1 lra 
Catania (CTA) 1 P 1 lra, naa 
Firenze (FLR) 1 T (2001) 0 lra 
Genova (GOA) 0 T (1954) 1 lra 
Lamezia (SUF) 0 PP 1 sra, lra 
Milano Linate, Malpensa 
(LIN, MXP) 0 T (1962) 1 lca 
Napoli (NAP) 1 T (2002) 1 lra 
Olbia (OLB) 1 T (2004) 0 lra 
Palermo (PMO) 0 P 1 lra 
Pescara (PSR) 0 PP 0 sra 
Pisa (PSA) 0 P 1 lra 
Rimini (RMI) 0 0 0 sra 
Roma Ciampino, Fiumicino 
(CIA, FCO) 1 T (1973) 1 lca 
Torino (TRN) 0 T (1965) 1 lra 
Treviso (TSF) 0 P 0 sra 
Trieste (TRS) 0 P 0 sra 
Venezia (VCE) 1 T (1986) 1 lra, naa 
Verona (VRN) 0 P 0 lra 
Types of concession agreement: Total (T), Partial (P), Precarious Partial (PP). Airport 
categories: large Community airport (lca), national airport (naa), large regional airport (lra), 
small regional airport (sra).  
 
                                                 
6
 Airport management company of Milano holds 49% of airport management company of Bergamo. 
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Table 2. Outputs and inputs: descriptive statistics 
models 
variables definition min max mean variation 
coef. 
physical       
 outputs      
 
number of 
movements 
total number of plans that lands 
and takes-off from the airport 
(unit) 
5076 379542 60088.7 1.48 
 number of 
passengers 
number of passenger who arrive at 
or depart from the airport (unit) 114024 35121826 4402276.7 1.73 
 amount of 
cargo amount of cargo (ton) 489 446596 37474.6 2.29 
 inputs      
 labour number of equivalent employees (unit) 23.06 6835.84 701.18 2.17 
 runway area total runways area (m2) 49500 2763600 241066.9 1.41 
 airport area airport area (ha) 55 1825 376.4 1.16 
       
monetary       
 outputs      
 
aeronautical 
revenues 
Revenues derived from 
aeronautical business (millions of 
euros) 
1544 394360 41542.0 1.78 
 non 
aeronautical 
revenues 
Revenues derived from non-
aeronautical business (millions of 
euros) 
297.35 245767 24622.1 2.30 
 inputs      
 labour cost labour cost (millions of euros) 969.1 263458 19888.3 1.99 
 
capital invested book value of fixed asset (millions 
of euros) 1481.1 2375682.2 171888.6 2.89 
 
soft cost 
operation cost excluding labour 
and capital costs (millions of 
euros) 
966.8 186562.8 23627.0 1.64 
       
 environmental 
variables      
 
seasonality (s) 
ratio of the maximum to the 
minimum number of passengers 
per month 
1.24 11.83 2.639 0.68 
 
wealth (we) 
value added per person relative to 
the airport area divided by the 
national value added per person 
62.91 159.40 101.70 0.26 
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Table 3. Correlations between variables. 
models        
physical (ph)        
  labour airport area runway area passengers cargos movements 
 labour 1.000      
 airport area 0.933 1.000     
 runway area 0.504 0.518 1.000    
 passenger 0.967 0.937 0.524 1.000   
 cargo 0.927 0.846 0.403 0.886 1.000  
 movement 0.977 0.938 0.522 0.995 0.904 1.000 
        
monetary (mo)        
  
labour cost soft cost capital invested 
aeronautical 
revenues 
non aeronau-
tical revenues  
 labour cost 1.000      
 soft cost 0.875 1.000     
 
capital 
invested 0.758 0.941 1.000    
 
aeronautical 
revenues 
0.966 0.945 0.856 1.000   
 
non 
aeronautical 
revenues 
0.878 0.977 0.959 0.951 1.000  
 
 
Table 4. Factors and inertia. 
model factors original variables inertia 
physical (ph)    
outputs   
 Po1 number of movements, of passengers and amount of cargo 0.952 
inputs  
 
 Pi1 labour and airport area 0965 
 Pi2 runway area  
monetary (mo)y    
outputs   
 Mo1  aeronautical revenues and non aeronautical revenues 0.979 
inputs   
 Mi1 capital invested and soft cost   
 Mi1 labour cost  0.972 
 
 
Table 5. Returns to scale: p-values. 5000 bootstrap replications. 
 years 
models 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
physical (ph)        
H0 CRS; H1: otherwise  0.947 0.952 0.947 0.913 0.942 0.937 0.914 
H0 NIRS; H1: VRS        
monetary (mo)        
H0 CRS; H1: otherwise  0.025 0.060 0.116 0.061 0.034 0.102 0.320 
H0 NIRS; H1: VRS  0.006 0.011 0.031 0.022 0.004 0.038 0.637 
CSR=constant returns to scale; VRS=variable returns to scale; NIRS = non increasing returns to scale.  
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Table 6. Bias corrected efficiency scores for the physical (ph) model. 5000 bootstrap replications. 
 technical efficiency scores  
airports(IATA CODE) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 geometric 
mean 
Alghero(AHO) 0.111 0.121 0.104 0.101 0.106 0.088 0.073 0.100 
Ancona(AOI) 0.196 0.227 0.210 0.205 0.202 0.151 0.122 0.184 
Bari, Brindisi, Foggia and 
Taranto(BDS BRI FOG 
TAR) 
0.138 0.146 0.113 0.124 0.116 0.084 0.079 0.112 
Bergamo(BGY) 0.609 0.590 0.496 0.448 0.487 0.388 0.399 0.482 
Bologna(BLQ) 0.531 0.508 0.417 0.313 0.313 0.336 0.319 0.381 
Cagliari(CAG) 0.788 0.803 0.786 0.695 0.743 0.651 0.590 0.718 
Catania(CTA) 0.418 0.415 0.334 0.320 0.302 0.245 0.239 0.318 
Firenze(FLR) 0.418 0.401 0.308 0.252 0.261 0.226 0.177 0.280 
Genova(GOA) 0.216 0.235 0.203 0.221 0.206 0.159 0.147 0.196 
Lamezia(SUF) 0.082 0.117 0.109 0.106 0.122 0.078 0.066 0.095 
Milano Linate and 
Malpensa(LIN MXP) 0.562 0.449 0.541 0.598 0.583 0.496 0.516 0.533 
Napoli(NAP) 0.466 0.542 0.527 0.457 0.325 0.225 0.154 0.353 
Olbia(OLB) 0.283 0.305 0.265 0.186 0.147 0.120 0.112 0.188 
Palermo(PMO) 0.332 0.355 0.301 0.290 0.288 0.223 0.233 0.285 
Pescara(PSR) 0.132 0.134 0.145 0.132 0.132 0.113 0.112 0.128 
Pisa(PSA) 0.147 0.189 0.163 0.180 0.181 0.149 0.150 0.165 
Rimini(RMI) 0.058 0.070 0.054 0.047 0.061 0.036 0.025 0.048 
Roma Ciampino and 
Fiumicino(CIA FCO) 0.433 0.397 0.358 0.306 0.311 0.260 0.253 0.325 
Torino(TRN) 0.255 0.270 0.166 0.205 0.228 0.176 0.153 0.203 
Treviso(TSF) 0.304 0.413 0.403 0.418 0.489 0.438 0.398 0.405 
Trieste(TRS) 0.110 0.128 0.115 0.102 0.103 0.081 0.076 0.101 
Venezia(VCE) 0.196 0.228 0.217 0.220 0.200 0.198 0.194 0.207 
Verona(VRN) 0.265 0.262 0.223 0.185 0.153 0.112 0.117 0.234 
geometric mean 
(bias uncorrected) 
0.249  
(0.353) 
0.268 
(0.378) 
0.235 
(0.350) 
0.221 
( 0.333) 
0.220 
(0.329) 
0.176 
(0.293) 
0.160 
(0.278) 
0.218 
(0.327) 
         
first quartile 0.143 0.168 0.154 0.156 0.140 0.113 0.112 0.147 
third quartile 0.426 0.414 0.381 0.317 0.312 0.253 0.246 0.339 
interquartile range 0.283 0.247 0.227 0.161 0.173 0.140 0.134 0.193 
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Table 7. Bias corrected efficiency scores for the monetary (mo) model. 5000 bootstrap replications. 
 pure technical efficiency scores (returns to scale)  scale efficiency 
airports(IATA 
CODE) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
geometric 
mean 
geometric 
mean 
returns 
to scale 
mode 
Alghero(AHO) 0.816(i) 0.739(i) 0.545(i) 0.388(i) 0.579(i) 0.460(i) 0.362(d) 0.533 0.815 i 
Ancona(AOI) 0.793(s) 0.885(s) 0.838(i) 0.778(i) 0.889(i) 0.787(s) 0.858(i) 0.831 0.990 i,s 
Bari, Brindisi, 
Foggia, Taranto 
(BRI, BDS, FOG, 
TAR) 
0.552(d) 0.444(d) 0.574(d) 0.674(i) 0.488(i) 0.454(d) 0.390(i) 0.503 0.997 d 
Bergamo(BGY) 0.742(d) 0.675(d) 0.614(d) 0.705(d) 0.871(d) 0.946(d) 0.844(d) 0.763 0.869 d 
Bologna(BLQ) 0.897(d) 0.938(d) 0.821(d) 0.771(d) 0.682(d) 0.724(d) 0.685(d) 0.783 0.877 d 
Cagliari(CAG) 0.449(d) 0.568(i) 0.855(i) 0.855(s) 0.658(i) 0.492(d) 0.525(i) 0.611 0.949 i 
Catania(CTA) 0.737(d) 0.841(d) 0.778(d) 0.936(d) 0.796(d) 0.786(d) 0.603(d) 0.776 0.874 d 
Firenze(FLR) 0.817(d) 0.807(d) 0.747(d) 0.746(d) 0.768(d) 0.938(d) 0.655(d) 0.779 0.973 d 
Genova(GOA) 0.540(d) 0.434(d) 0.478(s) 0.554(d) 0.777(i) 0.892(s) 0.801(s) 0.618 0.984 d,s 
Lamezia(SUF) 0.749(i) 0.921(i) 0.768(s) 0.757(s) 0.808(s) 0.835(i) 0.705(i) 0.789 1.012 i,s 
Milano Linate and 
Malpensa(LIN 
MXP) 
0.768(d) 0.772(d) 0.758(d) 0.773(d) 0.812(d) 0.844(d) 0.698(d) 0.774 0.939 d 
Napoli(NAP) 0.907(d) 0.904(s) 0.676(d) 0.818(d) 0.860(d) 0.954(d) 0.783(d) 0.838 0.943 d 
Olbia(OLB) 0.856(s) 0.870(s) 0.872(s) 0.767(d) 0.923(s) 0.943(s) 0.913(d) 0.876 0.991 s 
Palermo(PMO) 0.886(s) 0.920(d) 0.894(d) 0.528(d) 0.625(d) 0.804(d) 0.791(d) 0.765 0.911 d 
Pescara(PSR) 0.772(i) 0.775(i) 0.755(i) 0.733(i) 0.796(i) 0.784(i) 0.609(s) 0.744 0.635 i 
Pisa(PSA) 0.829(d) 0.899(d) 0.829(d) 0.848(d) 0.846(d) 0.940(d) 0.863(d) 0.864 0.910 d 
Rimini(RMI) 0.657(i) 0.799(i) 0.758(i) 0.734(i) 0.812(i) 0.781(i) 0.399(d) 0.689 0.781 i 
Roma Ciampino and 
Fiumicino(CIA 
FCO) 
0.794(d) 0.772(d) 0.753(s) 0.793(d) 0.833(d) 0.850(d) 0.714(s) 0.786 0.967 d 
Torino(TRN) 0.831(d) 0.893(d) 0.892(s) 0.836(s) 0.854(s) 0.953(i) 0.872(s) 0.875 0.999 s 
Treviso(TSF) 0.704(i) 0.882(i) 0.788(i) 0.806(i) 0.871(i) 0.847(i) 0.640(i) 0.787 0.904 i 
Trieste(TRS) 0.871(i) 0.776(i) 0.618(i) 0.617(i) 0.838(i) 0.900(i) 0.548(d) 0.726 0.886 i 
Venezia(VCE) 0.796(d) 0.895(d) 0.789(d) 0.869(d) 0.908(d) 0.911(s) 0.826(d) 0.855 0.929 d 
Verona(VRN) 0.728(d) 0.760(d) 0.712(d) 0.776(d) 0.902(d) 0.823(d) 0.779(d) 0.781 0.867 d 
geometric mean 
(bias uncorrected) 
0.750 
(0.849) 
0.775 
(0.861) 
0.735 
(0.844) 
0.730 
(0.836) 
0.782 
(0.864) 
0.794 
(0.873) 
0.669 
(0.780) 
0.747 
(0.843) 
0.909 
(0.876)  
           
first quartile 0.733 0.766 0.694 0.719 0.773 0.785 0.606 0.735 0.876  
third quartile 0.830 0.894 0.825 0.812 0.866 0.925 0.813 0.810 0.979  
interquartile range 0.098 0.128 0.131 0.093 0.093 0.140 0.208 0.076 0.103  
           
increasing return (i) 6 7 7 7 9 7 5    
decreasing return (d) 14 13 11 13 11 12 14    
scale efficiency (s)  3 3 5 3 3 4 4    
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Table 8. Determinants of technical inefficiency 
  physical 
model (ph) 
  monetary 
mode (mo) 
coefficients estimate  estimate 
intercept 7.549***  2.118*** 
total concession (T) 2.216  1.120** 
partial concession (P) 1.466  0.265 
ownership (o) 
-5.417***  -1.236** 
handling (hs) 
-5.177***  -0.728** 
seasonality (s) 0.986***  -0.038 
wealth (we) 
-0.072***  -0.018** 
time 1.067***  0.146** 
large Community airports (lca) 
-16.527**  -0.798 
national airports (naa) 
-3.154  0.173 
large regional airports (lra) 
-6.554***  0.025 
dual-till regulation 0.856  -0.838** 
sigma 3.457***  0.541*** 
Statistical significance: ***statistically significant at 1% level, **statistically significant at 5% level, 
*statistically significant at 10% level according to the bootstrap confidence intervals. B1=1000, 
B2=2000 bootstrap replications. 
 
 
